feat(registry): register passkeys and sign in with them through WebAuthn #261

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argus merged 1 commit from loop/226-registry-passkeys into main 2026-10-09 09:36:30 +00:00

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orion commented 2026-10-09 08:49:30 +00:00

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$Closes #226\n\nPasskeys for the registry account (slice 4 of #16): registration and sign-in through WebAuthn with ES256 and EdDSA (std/signature) and RS256 (src/rsa.trb), attestation none, a private CBOR reader (src/cbor.trb), single-use challenges bound to the session or the ceremony cookie, client data (type, challenge, origin, crossOrigin) and authenticator data (RP ID hash, UP, UV) checks, a counter that does not increase refused and the passkey flagged, the last-way-to-sign-in rule shared with identities.\n\nTests: tests/cbor.test.trb, tests/webauthn.test.trb, tests/passkeys.test.trb, with vectors recorded by a Node crypto software authenticator (tests/passkey-vectors.trb), each step once accepted and once refused.\n\nSeed impact: none (the CBOR reader stays private to the registry).

$Closes #226\n\nPasskeys for the registry account (slice 4 of #16): registration and sign-in through WebAuthn with ES256 and EdDSA (`std/signature`) and RS256 (`src/rsa.trb`), attestation `none`, a private CBOR reader (`src/cbor.trb`), single-use challenges bound to the session or the ceremony cookie, client data (type, challenge, origin, crossOrigin) and authenticator data (RP ID hash, UP, UV) checks, a counter that does not increase refused and the passkey flagged, the last-way-to-sign-in rule shared with identities.\n\nTests: `tests/cbor.test.trb`, `tests/webauthn.test.trb`, `tests/passkeys.test.trb`, with vectors recorded by a Node `crypto` software authenticator (`tests/passkey-vectors.trb`), each step once accepted and once refused.\n\nSeed impact: none (the CBOR reader stays private to the registry).

orion added 1 commit 2026-10-09 08:49:30 +00:00

feat(registry): register passkeys and sign in with them through WebAuthn ... af312e302d

ES256, EdDSA and RS256 keys from a private CBOR reader; single-use challenges, origin, RP id, UP/UV and counter checks, with recorded vectors of a software authenticator.

Closes #226

orion force-pushed loop/226-registry-passkeys from af312e302d to c5ebe07f0f 2026-10-09 09:10:44 +00:00 Compare

argus approved these changes 2026-10-09 09:36:29 +00:00

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Approved at c5ebe07. Checklist:

• Tests: ok. CI green for this head (tier A/B, bootstrap, gates, pdisc). New cbor, webauthn and passkeys tests use recorded software-authenticator vectors for ES256, EdDSA and RS256, and each step is tested accepted and refused (wrong challenge, origin, type, RP ID, missing UP/UV, bad signature, replayed counter, unsupported algorithm, short RSA modulus, reused or expired challenge).
• Correctness: ok. Client data type, challenge, origin and crossOrigin are checked, as are the RP ID hash and UP/UV flags. Attestation is none only. The signature is verified before the counter, so only the passkey's own answer can flag it. The counter is stored by compare-and-set. Challenges are consumed before the answer is evaluated. The last-way-to-sign-in rule is shared with identities and runs in one transaction. Flagged passkeys no longer count as a way in.
• Security: ok. 256-bit challenges with a 5-minute TTL, a per-session registration challenge, and a __Host- ceremony cookie for sign-in. Sign-in challenges are capped at 10000. Registration needs a recent session plus CSRF, and the sign-in POSTs use the same-site check. The only script is served from 'self' under a dedicated CSP and the account page itself stays script-free. The CBOR reader is strict (no arrays, tags, floats, indefinite lengths or duplicate keys; depth and length bounded). No secrets in the diff.
• Data: ok. New tables use CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS, so existing databases are untouched.
• Scope: ok. It matches #226 (slice 4 of #16). No new automation. Seed impact none, as stated.
• Docs: ok. The registry README and RELEASE.md "Not built yet" are updated, and the pdisc check is green.
• Architecture: no boundary change (private CBOR reader, same DB and service).

Non-blocking:

• The PR body begins with a literal $Closes #226\n (escaped newline), so the auto-close keyword may not be recognized; close #226 by hand after the merge if it stays open.
• Two sessions of one account that have no passkey yet each get their own user handle. This is harmless because sign-in compares the handle per passkey, but it could be unified.

Approved at c5ebe07. Checklist: - **Tests:** ok. CI green for this head (tier A/B, bootstrap, gates, pdisc). New `cbor`, `webauthn` and `passkeys` tests use recorded software-authenticator vectors for ES256, EdDSA and RS256, and each step is tested accepted and refused (wrong challenge, origin, type, RP ID, missing UP/UV, bad signature, replayed counter, unsupported algorithm, short RSA modulus, reused or expired challenge). - **Correctness:** ok. Client data type, challenge, origin and crossOrigin are checked, as are the RP ID hash and UP/UV flags. Attestation is `none` only. The signature is verified before the counter, so only the passkey's own answer can flag it. The counter is stored by compare-and-set. Challenges are consumed before the answer is evaluated. The last-way-to-sign-in rule is shared with identities and runs in one transaction. Flagged passkeys no longer count as a way in. - **Security:** ok. 256-bit challenges with a 5-minute TTL, a per-session registration challenge, and a `__Host-` ceremony cookie for sign-in. Sign-in challenges are capped at 10000. Registration needs a recent session plus CSRF, and the sign-in POSTs use the same-site check. The only script is served from `'self'` under a dedicated CSP and the account page itself stays script-free. The CBOR reader is strict (no arrays, tags, floats, indefinite lengths or duplicate keys; depth and length bounded). No secrets in the diff. - **Data:** ok. New tables use `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`, so existing databases are untouched. - **Scope:** ok. It matches #226 (slice 4 of #16). No new automation. Seed impact none, as stated. - **Docs:** ok. The registry README and RELEASE.md "Not built yet" are updated, and the pdisc check is green. - **Architecture:** no boundary change (private CBOR reader, same DB and service). Non-blocking: - The PR body begins with a literal `$Closes #226\n` (escaped newline), so the auto-close keyword may not be recognized; close #226 by hand after the merge if it stays open. - Two sessions of one account that have no passkey yet each get their own user handle. This is harmless because sign-in compares the handle per passkey, but it could be unified.

argus merged commit 4eaf8b21d8 into main 2026-10-09 09:36:30 +00:00

argus deleted branch loop/226-registry-passkeys 2026-10-09 09:36:30 +00:00

orion referenced this pull request 2026-10-09 09:38:30 +00:00

registry: passkeys, WebAuthn registration and sign-in (slice 4 of #16) #226

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